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IN THE SWREMX COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SUPREME COURT NO. 36535 
I 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I 
OOD DAVIDSON, . ) 
Defendants-Respondents ) 
., - . 
e number: CVOC 0803293 
siding at 1012 N. Pit Lane, Nampa, Idaho, 
ey for Defendants: Christ T. Troupis, for Jesyca Hood Davidson and Kathy Guthrie, 
at 1299 E. Iron Eagle Dr., Ste. 130, Eagle, Idaho, 83616,208-938-5584 
Michael E. Duggan, for Benjamin Puckett, residing at P.O.B. 3845, Nampa 
John Prior, Pro Se, residing at 16 12th Ave. So., Ste. 113, Nampa, Idaho, 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I) ATTY. TROUPIS CONTINUES HIS PATTERN OF PURPOSEFUL MIS- 
CONSTRUCTION, MISSTATEMENT OF THE FACTS, AND FAILS TO SUPPORT 
ARGUMENTS WITH AUTHORITY OR ADDRESS THE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL. 
I 
1 11) ATTY. TROUPIS' ARGUMENTS I AND I1 ARE NOTHING BUT RED 
I HERRINGS AND ARE PUT FORWARD ONLY TO NEEDLESSLY INCREASE COSTS. 
111) ATTY. TROUPIS' ARGUMENT 111 IS BASED UPON A FALSE PREMISE AND 
DOES NOT CITE TO THE RECORD OR ANY RELEVANT LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
CONCLUSION 
I ATTY. TROUPIS SHOULD BE SANCTIONED FOR FRIVOLOUS FILING. CASE 
SHOULD BE REMANDED WITH SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS. 
ARGUMENT 
I) ATTY. TROUPIS CONTINUES HIS PATTERN OF PURPOSEFUL MIS- 
CONSTRUCTION, MISSTATEMENT OF THE FACTS, AND FAILS TO SUPPORT 
ARGUMENTS WITH AUTHORITY OR ADDRESS TEE ISSUES RAISED ON APPEAL. 
Atty. Troupis in his Respondent's Brief, Argument IV claims generally that the trial 
court properly granted summary judgment, yet cites no authority in support of that opinion 
other than the Rosenberger decision which Davidson has thoroughly contended is inapposite 
(Appellant's Brief, Argument I, P. 6-10). Troupis does nothing to reclaim Rosenberger, except 
raise moot points about the trial judge's authority and timiig of summary judgment, apparently 
attempting to substitute churning of words and phrases, unneeded quotations, and more lawyer 
mumbo jumbo for legal argument. Davidson may be an "ignorant" pro se, but it is evident that 
Troupis' brief continues to ignore all basic facts and law which are inconvenient for Defendants. 
As but one example, two conflicting issues are intentionally convoluted, as if one 
provides support for the other: first, that immunity is granted or denied by the trial judge as part 
of the summary judgment process, which is not disputed (Appellant's Brief, Argument I, P. 4, L. 
2), and second, leaping to the unwarranted eoncIusion that the trial court had authority to 
abandon established procedures and seize control of fact finding at summay judgment, this 
without citing a single relevant precedent (Respondent's Brief, IV-D, P. 28, L. 3-9). In fact, the 
instant case to be tried to a jury (R. Vol. I. P. 17) and the summary judgment standards 
should have been the ones appropriate for that situation regardless of the label "immunity" being 
applied (Appellant's Brief, Argument I, P. 1 1, L. 23-P. 14, L. 8). No second set of "immunity 
standards" is shown by Troupis to exist in Idaho law, only the standards of I.R.C.P. 56 et seq. 
In Argument IV-B, Troupis unnecessarily quotes LC. 16-1607 and then quotes the trial 
court's use of a definition of bad faith from a contract ease without making any point about it - 
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whatsoever. Davidson has previously challenged the use of that definition in his Motion for 
Reconsideration (R. Vol. 111, P. 454) as it contains irrelevant elements such as the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and is merely a general assumption of the law of contracts. 
Once again, Troupis points to no authority in Idaho to support that particular definition in 
regards LC. 16-1606,1607, yet steadfastly avoids referring to the off-point Wyoming case law 
depended upon by the trial court (Appellant's Brief, Argument I, P. 4, L. 9-P. 6, L. 11) or to his 
earlier position misleading the trial court that good faith was a presumption requiring rebuttal and 
granting of immunity automatic under I.C. 16-1606 (Appellant's Brief, Argument I, P. 1, L. 17-25). 
On the other hand, the contract standard of bad faith does share one key element in 
common with the Black's Law Dictionary definition relied upon by Davidson, and that is the 
"dishonest purpose" which even the trial court found the Defendants possessed in this c a s ~  
(Appellant's Brief, Argument I, P. 1 1, L. 8-22). Although Idaho law contains little precedent on 
the issue, California courts have held that bad faith can be proven through circumstantial evidence 
and that a "pattern and practice of similar misconduct" (in the instant case, serial unsubstantiated 
and unfounded reports of child abuse naming Davidson as the alleged perpetrator) may be used to 
prove the element of bad faith (Colonial Lfe anddccident ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 647 P.2d 
86). Once again, no mention by Troupis of Jesyca and Kathy's proven serial false reporting , as 
Defendants want to keep up the charade that the ody report was to CC Sheriff on 7-19-2007. 
As to the criminal code definition of malice depended upon by the trial court, a "wish to 
vex, annoy, or injure another person" (Respondent's Brief, IV-B, P. 19, L. 1-3) is exactly what 
Davidson proved about Jesyca and Kathy by evidence through his affidavits (Appellant's Brief, 
Argument 111, P. 44, L. 2-13). If a judge does not believe that having threatening violent gestures 
and vicious epithets screamed out at them from a passing car is malicious, then that judge is 
completely devoid of human empathy. The mere fact that the trial judge erroneously labeled 
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Jesyca's and Kathy's malice toward Davidson "acrimony" disproves no evidence proffered by 
Davidson; it only shows the trial court's blind determination to let the Defendants off the hook. 
Further, Ben's testimonial statements to CC Sheriff plus his admissions (Appellant's 
Brief, Argument I, P.7, Argument 111, P. 34, L. 9-13, P.42, L. 18-25), prove Jesyca and Kathy 
had convinced Ben through hearsay and falsity over several months that Davidson was (mong 
other things) an "admitted child molester." Ben clearly articulated his malice toward Davidson in 
two separate recorded police interviews, culminating with a death threat against Davidson, a 
person Ben admits he has never even seen, let alone met (R Vol. 11, P. 361, p. 4, L. 20-25, P. 
362, p. 5, L. 1-5). These are not "minor inconsistencies," they prove a hateful, spiteful mindset 
of ill will toward Davidson, raise material factual disputes, and a reasonable inference can be 
drawn from these facts that there were malicious actions directed toward Davidson in 2007 by 
the Defendants, call it "acrimony" or whatever. The existence of different inferences about a 
disputed set of facts calls for a jury trial under the laws and constitution of Idaho and the U.S. 
Troupis raises another straw man on Page 19 of his brief, wasting three-fourths of a page 
with a single-spaced quote from the Rees case and baldly claiming (with no reference to the 
record) that the trial judge used this quote to "evaluate the immunity provision." The record 
shows the trial court actually just briefly cited Rees for a general reiteration of I.C. 16-1606, 
which "grants immunity to any person who makes a good faith rep0 rt..." (R. Vol. 111, P. 438C, L. 
3-5). In fact, the Rees case primarily stands for the proposition that Health and Welfare and its' 
agents have a statutory duty to perform a competent investigation, and if they don't, they can be 
sued. In the instant case, all investigations showed no abuse took place so "the policy underlying 
the C.P.A." is without jurisdiction. This case is about false reporting, so Davidson merely citedto Rees for its 
fmal conclusion that the presence of material hctual disputes concerning specific elements of 
statutow immunity (here malice or bad faith, in Rees, the negligence of the investigator) is the 
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standard of proof required for the district court to deny summary judgment and immunity. That 
directly opposes the trial court's improvised, newly-created standard that was especially aimed 
at Davidson and this one particular case alone (Appellant's Brief, Argument I, P. 10, L. 7-16). 
In section C (Respondent's Brief, IV, P. 20) Troupis attempts to pretend the trial court 
actually ruled on the admissibility of evidence. Only one cite to the record is made in which the 
trial judge referred to part of a police report consisting of a few pages (R Vol. 11. P. 218-223). 
However, the evidence put into the record by Davidson goes from P. 218 to 350; that equals 132 
pages of relevant documentary evidence, including 3 Health and Welfare reports, 2 medical 
reports, testimonial statements Jesyca and Ben made to police, perjured petitions for domestic 
violence protection orders by Jesyca, perjured affidavits by Jesyca and John Prior, depositions, 
admissions, etc., not to mention 12 Plaintiffs aEdavits &om various material fact witnesses (R. 
Ex. 4,5,6,7,8,9,11,12,17,19,21,25) none of which was ever ruled inadmissible by the trial court, 
and none of which was ever objected to or refuted. The trial judge in this case tyas "too busy" to 
review or rule on evidence (Appellant's Brief, Argument 111, P. 32, para. d). That is not the same 
as Troupis' unsubstantiated claim that Davidson's proof has been ruled deficient in any way. 
The above referenced exhibits were filed with the trial court in Opposition to Summary 
Judgment which included a 28 page brief (R. Vol. 11, P. 189). None of the arguments, nor the 
disputed material facts, nor the evidence was ever addressed or ruled on in any way by the trial 
judge, other than "inconsistencies" in the police report. Instead, the trial court merely para- 
phrased the untested affidavit of Jesyca, deemed her version of events "established facts" and 
granted immunity. The trial court admitted material factual disputes exist in the case, but elevated 
Jesyca and Ben's drug addled (R. Vol. 11, P. 335, p. 10,11) claim of subjective "belief' to the level 
of convincing proof, while ignoring all evidence to the contrary moving the goal post since 
material factual disputes no longer count under the new rules freshly-minted by the trial judge. 
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The trial court never ruled on evidence (Respondent's Brief, W ,  P. 21, L. 17-23, see also 
Appellants Brief, Argument 111). Simply presuming Davidson guilty with no proof, making 
prohibited, thinly-disguised credibility determinations, and addimg an impossible to overcome 
presumption of good faith to I.C. 16-1606 is not ruling on admissibility of evidence and widely 
deviates from the established procedures for summiq judgment and all available Idaho precedent. 
11) ATIT. TROUPIS' ARGUMENTS I AND I1 ARE NOTHING BUT RED HEXRINGS 
AND PUT FORWARD ONLY TO NEEDLESSLY INCREASE COSTS. 
Atty. Troupis spins out more falsehood and misleading claims in his Arguments I and 11. 
For example, on P. 11, L. 24 and 25, he premises his argument on the falsehood that "George 
Davidson claimed that Kathy and Jesyca made a statement to Seneca Crow ..." concerning alleged 
child abuse. The record proves that prima facie false @ Vol. I, P. 20, para. 26): "...Jesyca went 
unexpectedly to visit an acquaintance, Seneca Crow, of Boise, and told him a totally distorted 
version of the events described herein, in front of two other witnesses ..." (See also, the Affidavit 
of Seneca Crow, R. Ex. 5). The witnesses were "David" and "Jake" not Kathy Guthrie, nor did 
Kathy have any prior knowledge of Jesyca's actions in the Seneca Crow incident, nor does 
Troupis point to any record to support Kathy's involvement in that incident in any way. 
Troupis does correctly point out that Kathy's role in this case was as the instigator and 
material supporter of the civil conspiracy (Respondent's Brief, Argument 1, P. 1 I, L. 13-16). As 
Davidson correctly pointed out to the trial court on May 7,2009, whether or not Kathy had 
officially been granted immunity or summary judgment along with Jesyca and Ben, all claims 
against her had been dis~osed of at summary judgment (GosneyTr. P. 319, L. 20-25, P. 320, L. 1). 
The only claim that remained for trial was the previously noted Seneca Crow incident which only 
implicated Jesyca, and at least one element of proof of each one of the torts in that case had been 
implicitly ruled inadmissible by the trial judge's granting of immunity, i.e. there was no longer 
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admissible evidence to support any remaining claim of slander per se (falsity contained in the 
serial unsubstantiated and unfounded reporting and perjury), I.I.E.D. (Seneca Crow incident 
despicable, but probably not outrageous, and emotional distress claim cannot stand without 
slander per se, Uranga v. Federated Publ. Inc. DBA The Idaho Statesman, 138 Idaho 550), abuse 
of process (no longer allowed to talk about the process), or negligence (no more statutory duty to 
refrain from false reporting). The conspiracy, active participation in which made Kathy jointly 
and severally liable, fails without a tort to support it (McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391). The 
trial court had noted in its' Memorandum Decision granting summary judgment, that Kathy 
"...Guthie may have disclosed more to her partner than she claimed in her affidavit" @. Vol. 111, 
P. 43833, L. 8-1 1). Yet a reading of Davidson's complaint shows no claim against Kathy for that; 
her "partner" did not respect a duly-issued subpoena and failed to appear for a deposition and so 
apparently refuses to testify as to anything Kathy told her, and at any rate, the trial judge c m o t  
create a cause of action for Davidson that was not in the complaint, and neither can Troupis. 
To fully understand the actions of the trial court on May 7,2009, one needs to read the 
entire passage in the record (GosneyTr. P. 3 19, L. 20- P. 327, L. 17) concerning the dismissal 
agreed to only in order to undertake this appeal. In Troupis' out of context snippet the trial judge 
is heard to state: " ... I would simply dismiss the balance of the case but he [Davidson] would 
reserve the right to go ahead and appeal any decisions I had made concerning immunity or 
probably any other issues that I had addressed as well." (emphasis added, Respondent's Brief, 
Argument I, P. 12). The language employed by the trial judge clearly indicates that he, along with 
Davidson, Troupis, and Duggan all shared the viewpoint that the dismissal of the remaining claim 
was conditioned upon what, if any, action this Court took in the way of remand after appeal. 
Troupis even responded "I think I understand it the same way." (ibid). The trial judge made his 
view of the dismissal crystal clear when he said "If the Supreme Court were to reverse me and 
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say that I should not have granted immunity... it would come back for trial and the dismissal with 
preiudice would be gone a m a v  and it would be subiect to retrial. If they a f f i i  me, I think it is 
res judicata at that point and it is dismissed with prejudice so I am not sure it makes a lot of 
difference." (GosneyTr. P. 326, L. 17-25 P. 327, L. 1, emphasis added). After Davidson 
expressed his perception of the conditional dismissal, the trial judge reiterated his belief that " ... I 
think we can dismiss with prejudice given that and because again, I don't think it in the long run 
will make any digerence one way or the other" (ibid, P. 327, L. 14-17). 
Troupis, with this utterly frivolous judicial estoppel argument, is attempting to stop an 
appeal -From taking place on certain issues unspecified by him, but res judicata is not intended to 
do that: "...a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an 
absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim." (Hindmarsh 
v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92). The trial judge, by his own admission on the record, only considered it 
res judicata if he was affirmed by the Supreme Court, but that all other claims in the case would 
be reinstated for "retrial" upon a remand. Even if there was any procedural objection raised to a 
reinstatement of the claim dismissed in the action, it could easily be overcome by 1.RC.P. 60(b) 
(ibid. P. 141); judgments can be vacated by the trial court for good cause at any reasonable time. 
Obviously, this dismissal was as per the judge's order under 1.RC.P. 41(a)(2), 
not voluntary. While Troupis self-servingly labels the dismissal voluntary, he does not cite the 
authority of I.R.C.P. 41(a)(l), probably because he already knows this situation does not meet 
the terms and preconditions of a voluntary dismissal as described in that rule. As if M e r  proof 
was needed, Davidson himself said the dismissal was not voluntary: "So if you want to, even 
though I am not saving this voluntarilv as if oh, gee, you know I should have never filed this in 
the first place. No, absolutely not ... I think this is an important case ... I think the Supreme Court 
should be allowed to have a crack at this case and let's see what they think about it because then 
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I fhink we can come back and have the trial where I actuallv am allowed to vresent the merits of 
my case with evidence" (GosneyTr. P. 324, L. 10-24, emphasis added). Clearly, Davidson was 
aware the merits of his case had never been reached, and was seeking expedient appellate review 
without any further unnecessary delays (GosneyTr. P. 317, L. 16-25, trial court indicating it did 
not have time to hear argument or make a ruling on Davidson's Motion for I.R.C.P. 54@) 
certificate even though that motion was noticed up for hearing &at day - see B Vol. I ,  R.O.A. 5-7-2009). 
m) A m .  TROWIS' ARGUMENT III IS BASED WON A FALSE PREMISE AND 
DOES NOT CITE TO THE RECORD OR ANY RELEVANT LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
The Memorandum Decision and Order (R. Vol. I, P. 53) purportedly dismissing John 
Prior under 12@)(6) and Malmin v. Engler has nothing to do with granting immunity to Jesyca, 
nor does Troupis direct this Court to the portion of the record fhat supposedly says it does. The 
trial court itself wrongly convoluted slander per se with abuse of process (Appellant's Brief, 
Argument 2, P. 16, L. 15-21), and Davidson has maintained all along that all of the Defendants 
shared equal responsibility for all of the torts through conspiracy. Co-conspirators do not even 
have to actually commit a tort if they (like Kathy) have provided a tortfeasor material support 
and encouragement to commit the tortious acts (Restatement, Second, of Torts, Sec. 876). Nor 
does every member of the conspiracy have to commit every tort or need to know the details of 
every action or word of every other member of the conspiracy in order to be found liable (ibid). 
John Prior was not the primary actor in defamation. Instead, he was the primary actor in 
the abuse of process tort and was negligent per se in his duties as a lawyer. He was responsible 
for the I.I.E.D. and the slander per se though supporting and encouraging Jesyca to further her 
torts so he could gain leverage over the Davidsons in the small claims suit and the child custody 
action. The trial court mistakenly identified Prior as a primary actor in the slander per se: "...it 
appears &om the Complaint that the allegedly false allevations attributed to Defendant Prior were 
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part of judicial proceedings related to visitation between Plaintiff and his granddaughters" (R. 
Vol. I, P. 56, L. 6-8, emphasis added). Notice there is no mention of Jesyca and her participation 
in the abuse of process tort with Prior, let alone her defamation. Troupis is just making things up 
and trying to put words in the trial judge's mouth to try racking up more exorbitant lawyer fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Tip O'Neil once famously said "You are 
eatitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts." If Jesyca and Kathy 
and their paid lawyer would heed that basic advice, this controversy would not now be raging. 
Troupis has instead done in this Respondent's Brief precisely what Davidson expected him to do 
and what he has done in this case liom day one, and that is to heed the cynical advice of the 
Roman Senator Cicero liom 100 B.C.: "If you do not have the facts on your side, argue the law. 
If you do not have the law on your side, argue the facts. If you do not have the facts or the law 
on your side, SLANDER T!dE PLAINTIFF!" 
Respondent's brief is the definition of frivolous under I.A.R. 1 l(1). It does not respond 
to Appellant's Brief, nor contain one cogent legal argument, has little basis in fact, is filled with 
irrelevant, unnecessary "bullet point" cites and quotations, and ultimately resorts to the same 
overused presumption of guilt, slander the Plaintiff gibberish that has passed for a defense with 
Jesyca and Kathy ever since Troupis began representing them. Troupis should be sanctioned. 
To the best of my knowledge and belief, this Appellant's Reply Brief is a true and accurate 
statement of the facts and the law pertaining to this case. 
Signed and Dated this i dayof , Q J Q J Z O ~ ~ .  
George &idson - PlaintifUAppellant pro se 
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